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Professor Glendon ends her discussion of abortion law by say-
ing that "[i]n the long run, the way in which we name things and 
imagine them may be decisive for the way we feel and act with re-
spect to them, and for the kind of people we ourselves become." I 
would ask that she think about whether we want a return to a world 
in which we imagine motherhood as compulsory, and whether that 
way of "imagining the real" might indeed be "decisive for the way 
we feel and act with respect" to women, with disastrous conse-
quences for us all. 
TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION. By David 
A.J. Richards.' New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 
1986. Pp. xvii, 348. $29.95. 
MEN AND MARRIAGE. By George Gilder.2 Gretna, La.: 
Pelican Publishing Company. 1986. Pp. xix, 200. $15.95. 
Thomas P. Lewis 3 
The only justification for reviewing these books jointly is the 
study in contrasts they provide. Professor David Richards's book is 
about constitutional law and judicial review. For academic philoso-
phers, it may be an easy read, but most lawyers will find it a turgid, 
prolix, and abstruse exercise in hermeneutics. George Gilder's book 
is not about judicial review or the Constitution. It is a sharp, clear 
anthropological statement, grounded largely in Gilder's interpreta-
tion of empirical evidence about sex roles. Each book covers sub-
stantial territory not explored in the other, but there is some overlap 
of underlying subject matter. When they address the same topics, 
Richards and Gilder reach markedly different conclusions. Abor-
tion and homosexuality, for example, are constitutional issues that 
both books discuss. What Professor Richards stoutly concludes are 
constitutional rights, to be freely exercised in the pursuit of personal 
wholeness, Gilder dismisses as the ingredients or symptoms of sex-
ual suicide and societal ruin. 
I. Professor of Law, New York University. 
2. Gilder's book is a revision of his earlier SEXUAL SUICIDE (1973). In the Preface to 
MEN AND MARRIAGE he says that several prominent publishers had offered to reissue SEX-
UAL SUICIDE, but in every case called back later "to tell me-{)r imply strongly-that pro-
tests from feminist editors had balked them." 
3. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. 
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I 
In the brief compass of a review I can only mention the high-
lights of Richards's elaborate argument. He begins simply enough 
by saying that a sound interpretive approach to the Constitution 
must derive from an understanding of the political theory and envi-
ronment surrounding its birth. It is not enough to read the text, 
along with its narrow "legislative history." Rather, we must look to 
the larger philosophical and political conceptions that underlay the 
Bill of Rights. Drawing on such thinkers as Locke, 4 Kant, and 
Rousseau, Richards surmises that the founders grounded the Con-
stitution on "contractarian political theory" reflecting the "moral 
sovereignty of the people." 
The last phrase must not be confused with "popular sover-
eignty," relied upon in different ways according to Richards by 
Raoul Berger and James B. Thayer. The framers should not be re-
garded as the applicable sovereign, as Richards says Berger would 
have it, because our generation should not be bound by the will of 
theirs. Nor can we accept the sovereignty of the people as reflected 
in legislative majorities, as Thayer suggested. Instead, the moral 
sovereignty of the people in the context of contractarian theory 
means that the people-presumably Richards is referring to the 
founders who acted for them-conditioned constitutional govern-
ment on a "conception of justice" that "aims to protect an idealized 
moral conception of persons as free, rational, and equal." 
Developing his interpretation of the "abstract intentions," 
"background rights," and "political and moral culture" that found 
expression in the Bill of Rights, primarily the religion and free 
speech clauses of the first amendment, Richards develops a con-
ception of an "inalienable right to conscience" and its natural con-
sequence, "universal toleration," founded on "equal respect for 
persons." The enforcement of universal toleration depends upon 
constitutional judicial review, proceeding from a theory of legal in-
terpretation that "must . . . as part of its interpretive task, utilize 
historical reconstruction of traditions of the community. Such a re-
construction may best define the community's sense of what its tra-
ditions now mean or should mean." The implications of the phrase 
"should mean" will be clear to any careful reader: Because the 
Constitution represents a "self-conscious" effort by the founders to 
"use the best political [and moral] theory and political science of the 
age ... to create a written text of constraints on state power," so 
4. As Professor John Roche has recently noted, quoting Madison, turning to Locke is 
" 'a field of research which is more likely to perplex than to decide.' " Roche, Constitutional 
Scholarship, What Next?, 5 CoNST. CoMM. 21 (1988). 
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continuance of the tradition requires interpretation that would call 
upon the best modem political and moral theory "of an explicitly 
contractarian kind." In short, the "community's sense" of its tradi-
tions is not to be determined by the community. 
A key element of Richards's "historiographical" analysis is the 
decision of the founders to develop a written constitution. He in-
sists on interpreting the document; no extra-constitutional nonsense 
for him. Yet he rejects any notion that the courts should apply his 
interpretive theory in a clause-bound fashion. The text seems to be 
important only as it reflects the founders' larger preoccupation with 
certain political and moral beliefs. "General political theory" can 
be used to "explicate larger interpretive patterns common to verti-
cally disjoint constitutional texts." The founders' expression of 
these patterns "grows out of a larger cultural and moral tradition 
that conceives political legitimacy on a contractarian model calling 
for observance by the state of predictable and orderly constraints 
that acknowledge and express the dignity of persons and citizens as 
free, rational, and equal." 
Although Richards draws heavily on the work of classic phi-
losophers, he believes that only selected portions of their work 
should now be controlling. For Locke's contractarian theory was, 
after all, associated with "economic privilege," Rousseau's has been 
rejected as "totalitarian," and Kant's might make sense only as 
"proto-utilitarianism." It is only the best contemporary con-
tractarian theory that is to be enforced through judicial review. If 
earlier contractarian theory is "rootedly antiredistributive, an-
tiegalitarian, antiliberal . . . and at bottom, proto-utilitarian" a 
"contemporary contractarian theory of some depth and sophistica-
tion, like Rawls's, not only makes possible a revival of nonu-
tilitarian political philosophy, but enables us [and the Supreme 
Court] to ... find a distinctive approach to political legitimacy" 
which lacks these flaws. 
I find this somewhat confusing. Richards avers that the will of 
a long-dead generation cannot bind present generations, yet he also 
believes that it can: to a conception of justice founded on the moral 
sovereignty of the people in a relationship of covenant with the gov-
ernment, a conception to be fleshed out from time to time by a ma-
jority of the Justices of the Supreme Court, as they digest and 
accept the best contemporary political and moral philosophy. But 
there are limits, to be found in portions of Locke's, or Kant's, or 
Rousseau's thoughts. Locke is there, at the founding, and he isn't. 
Kant is there whether he was or not. Certainly, says Richards, we 
cannot accept Locke's bigotry toward Catholics and atheists, or his 
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preoccupation with property. Contrary to what Locke would coun-
tenance, Richards believes that parents have a right to send their 
children to parochial schools. At the same time, any form of gov-
ernmental assistance to those schools would unconstitutionally "en-
dorse" such parental "value imposition," because it would be 
contrary to the "Lockean political theory so central to the religion 
clauses . . . . " "Children, for Locke, are neither the property of 
their parents nor of the state, both of whom are under moral obliga-
tions to them to assure the appropriate care and development of 
their moral powers," that is, their right to form their own beliefs. 
Since for Richards belief formation is not limited to religious 
matters, but covers the waterfront of thought, his ideas come peril-
ously close to condemning compulsory public education as uncon-
stitutional. He concludes, however, that it is a "general good," but 
the system must "limit itself to imparting the general educational 
goods that develop our rational and reasonable powers, and avoid 
endorsing specific substantive conceptions that those powers should 
adopt." We are not told just how this is to be done without creating 
classes whose tedium will make students yearn for Latin I. 
Through four chapters dealing with religion, conscience, and 
speech, and two developing his major end product, a "theory of 
constitutional privacy," Richards seeks to create (or to distill, for he 
always has at least one foot in the past) and apply the best con-
tractarian political and moral theory. The theme of universal toler-
ation and equal respect is repeated over and over again, with 
slightly varying phraseology. Every person has "rational" and 
"moral independence": the right to exercise the "highest order twin 
moral powers of rationality and reasonableness in belief formation 
and revision," and the right to "the exercise of the conceptions of a 
life well and ethically lived and expressive of a mature person's ra-
tional and reasonable powers." And so on. Each person may act 
out these rights, subject to the state's right to protect or conserve 
"general goods," for "various all-purpose general or primary goods, 
including life and bodily security," are also entitled to "equal re-
spect." General goods, sometimes called "neutral harms," cannot 
depend for definition on "conventional conceptions of public moral-
ity," Locke to the contrary notwithstanding. Rather, putting moral 
consensus aside, general goods are "things all persons could reason-
ably accept as all-purpose conditions of pursuing their aims, 
whatever they are." They are "only those interests of persons 
whose necessary protection is acceptable to all reasonable persons at 
large." Yes, all reasonable persons: one man, one veto. 
It is clear to Richards that none of this has relevance for such 
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matters as the commerce clause or substantive economic due pro-
cess. How he knows that those constitutional values do not require 
aggressive judicial scrutiny, without first subjecting them to the 
same type of "historiographical" analysis he gives to the first 
amendment, is not explained. It occurs to me that the soundest part 
of his analysis, the background rights idea, but with an eye on the 
constitutional text, including the truism that all text must have 
some purpose, would provide strong support for the dissenters in 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. But Rich-
ards has other fish to fry. 
In his chapters on privacy Richards deals with contraception, 
abortion, and sexual autonomy as privacy rights. With respect to 
the last, he is concerned principally with homosexual acts. His 
treatment of abortion focuses on the general goods half of his equa-
tion to protect individual autonomy. After satisfying himself that 
person-potential does not make a fetus a person (because the con-
trary view could be based only on nonneutral religious or metaphys-
ical assumptions), and that therefore the "usual proscription of 
homicide" does not apply to abortion, he asks whether the preserva-
tion of the fetus is an interest that could qualify as a general good. 
"The lives of nonpersons . . . are not common goods of this kind." 
Protection of such lives would not be viewed as "so necessary to the 
lives of all rational people that each person could reasonably accept 
protections of such goods by the criminal law even at the cost of 
essential interests in moral independence." 
Richards heroically tries to distinguish abortion restrictions 
from protection of animals, infants, and senile folks. "True," he 
says, "some philosophers have denied that the neonate is a person 
and thus claim that infanticide does not violate anyone's natural 
right to life." All we get in response is an assurance that their view 
is not "inevitable," that "one may reasonably argue," and "a crite-
rion of dissimilarity may be formulated to sort out these matters."s 
Nowhere do I find Richards stating that all people would reason-
ably agree that protection of a retarded newborn is so "indispensa-
ble" to the "lives of all rational people that each person" would 
accept it even if, for some, the effect was to destroy their indepen-
dently conceived notions of lives well lived. 
It might help if Richards explained more fully how judgments 
5. Professor Tribe, who shares Richards's conclusion about abortion, gets there via a 
somewhat different route. Along the way he has this to say: "But all normative judgments 
are rooted in moral premises; surely the judgment that it is wrong to kill a two-week old 
infant is no less 'moral' in inspiration than the judgment, less frequently made but no less 
strongly felt by many of those who make it, that it is wrong to kill a two-day old fetus." L. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1350 (2d ed. 1988). 
142 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 6:115 
are to be made about what all people reasonably will or will not 
accept. Apparently their "votes" must be reasonable, yet it is clear 
that as they weigh their choices their premises have to include, as a 
control on the state, the right of every person capable of reason to 
think and thus to desire to act in "evil" and "intolerant" ways. For 
"moral independence" has no meaning as a right if everyone must 
think and act in a "reasonable" way.6 
I have tried to figure out why, though I agree with Richards 
that sodomy, as such, should not be a penal offense, it nevertheless 
strikes me as so incongruous to find a solemn argument for a consti-
tutional right to engage in anal intercourse at the end of a tome 
otherwise chiefly devoted to an ornate analysis of the founding era. 
Perhaps it is because of my feeling that nothing could have been 
further removed from the "background rights" the founders had in 
mind when they drafted the Bill of Rights. Or maybe it is because 
of my impression that the issue is at least partly spurious: Ameri-
can governments are not locking up people who are guilty only of 
private, consensual sodomy. The real issue, it seems to me, is 
whether the government may support the taboo against homosexu-
ality, and if so, whether unenforced criminal laws are a permissible 
means. 
Richards has a broader agenda than the decriminalization of 
homosexual acts, though he makes a passionate and appealing argu-
ment about the bad effects of criminalization. His aim is to per-
suade people that such conduct is simply an alternative lifestyle. 
"The same considerations that debar the power of the state to ho-
mogenize religion or thought or speech require institutional respect 
for ways of life expressive of a just moral independence." In the 
case of constitutional privacy, "resources central to the independent 
exercise of our moral powers are justly protected against a hostile 
and homogenizing public scrutiny." Certainly this means that or-
ganized society is to be neutral; it cannot regulate, teach, or preach 
to further a viewpoint. It is less clear whether Richards means also 
to posit a societal obligation to protect against a hostile public scru-
tiny. His general goods formula might accommodate that ap-
proach, but the text of the first amendment could be a problem-for 
others, if not for Richards. In any event, to support his argument 
6. In connection with the similarity of Richards's approach to general or primary 
goods and the Rawlsian "veil of ignorance," Professor Tushnet observed: "I believe that one 
of the central controversies over Rawls's approach is whether he has so stripped his rational 
contractors of their human capacities as to make it incoherent to talk about what 'they' 
would choose. Richards goes farther than Rawls in making his contractors, quite literally, 
disembodied." Tushnet, Sex, Drugs. and Rock 'n' Roll: Some Conservative Reflections on 
Liberal Jurisprudence (Book Review), 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1540 (1982). 
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Richards feels bound to make the case that all forms of sexual activ-
ity are equally wholesome. 
It's not easy to define a community's "tradition." Richards 
would have the Court declare that our traditions require individual 
moral independence. But if our traditions were really so simple, 
Richards wouldn't need to write his book. Must the Court ignore 
those traditions that are exceptions to our general notions of moral 
laissez-faire? 
II 
George Gilder does not possess the imposing scholarly creden-
tials of a Milton Friedman. But I have heard him described as the 
Milton Friedman of sexual sociology-conservative, brilliant, parti-
san, dogmatic, lucid, and anathema to many professors of constitu-
tional law. His message is simple: "Monogamy is central to any 
democratic social contract, designed to prevent a breakdown of so-
ciety .... " This conclusion follows from Gilder's analysis of male 
sexuality and what he regards as crucial differences between the 
male and the female, whose sexual superiority is quite simply "the 
prime fact of life." The woman is complete; her sexuality is diffused 
throughout her body, and her sexual identity so unimpeachable as 
to be taken for granted by her. The man's role, by contrast, makes 
him more dispensable, and hence less secure. But his male identity 
will be asserted somehow. "Voluminous" evidence reveals that hor-
monal influences shape men and women differently, men being 
more aggressive, violent, muscular, competitive, and less nurturant, 
moral, and stable. As societies moved from the male-as-hunter 
model to the male-as-farmer model, a movement that Gilder says 
anthropologists frequently credit to women, the problem that Mar-
garet Mead called the "central issue" of every society arose: "what 
to do with the males." Gilder's answer, developed at some length, 
is that the male's masculinity must be tamed, his barbarian nature 
must be socialized, and this is accomplished through subjecting it to 
female patterns, via monogamous marriage and family responsibili-
ties. Central to this process, says Gilder, is maintenance of the 
male-as-provider model. Much of the book is devoted to descrip-
tion of what he sees as the consequences for society of a breakdown 
in this pattern. The picture he draws is not pretty: crime, violence, 
drugs, homosexuality, and despair. 
Gilder paints an especially drab picture of male homosexuality, 
proceeding from premises that differ in almost every detail from 
those of Richards. For Richards, homosexuality is a fixed and 
largely immutable condition; for Gilder this is a myth that is "the 
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most powerful tool of the homosexual culture." Where Richards 
can find no evidence of harm from sodomy, Gilder cites startling 
statistics of infectious diseases among male homosexuals in the 
1980s, charging that the "liberal journalists," "pliable psycholo-
gists," and "pandering politicians," among others, "who condoned 
the most extreme homosexual behavior as an acceptable life-style 
are the true sources of the AIDS epidemic." 
For Gilder, however, homosexuality is not the root problem 
(though for too many it means a squalid life), but rather a symptom 
and part of a larger problem: the breakdown of monogamy. Be-
cause he believes an "enormous number of homosexuals have 
clearly been recruited from the ranks of the physically normal," he 
would not relax the social pressures in favor of heterosexuality. 
"This emphatically does not mean harassing or imprisoning homo-
sexuals." (It occurs to me that such compromises may be our domi-
nant tradition: we create taboos and withhold approval; yet we 
tacitly recognize a liberty interest.) 
The real problem, says Gilder, is single men. Their image is 
glamorous: "freedom and power"; "The naked nomad in the bed-
rooms of the land. . . . The hero of the film and television drama; 
cool, violent, sensuous, fugitive, free." The reality, recognizing that 
there are millions of exceptions: "Violence and crime join with 
mental illness, mild neurosis, depression, addiction, AIDS, institu-
tionalization, poverty, unemployment, and nightmares to comprise 
the specialized culture of single men in America. . . . Of all groups, 
single males have the highest mortality rate-and suicide is increas-
ingly the way they die." 
Gilder's statistics are impressive. But do men have the 
problems because they are single or are they single because they 
have the problems? Gilder seeks to make the case that singleness is 
the cause and marriage is the cure. Along the way he observes that 
while blacks as perpetrators and victims account for almost half of 
all violent crimes, "the central facts about crime are not racial; they 
are sexual." 
Like the radical feminists, Gilder sees men as violent. While 
the radical feminists want to escape from the beast, however, Gilder 
wants to tame him. For the radical feminists, marriage and chil-
dren are chains for women, and therefore bad. For Gilder, they are 
civilizing links for men, and therefore good. 
Gilder is somewhat more specific in identifying the sources of 
the problem than he is in proposing remedies. The alleged sources 
include social, economic, and educational policies that Gilder sees 
as contributing to a breakdown in monogamy and two-parent fami-
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lies. Among the policies that have this effect are: 1) those that en-
courage women to leave the home for careers, or worse, make it 
economically difficult if not impossible for them to choose the home 
and child care as their role; 2) welfare programs that dissolve "the 
ties that bind men to their children" (and, incidentally, have a dis-
proportionate effect on black family formation); 3) educational poli-
cies, including coeducation, especially in the early grades, and jobs 
and defense policies that ignore or seek to obliterate differences be-
tween the sexes; and 4) attitudes, laws, and technical breakthroughs 
that increase the woman's control of procreation. 
Gilder finds more implications in each of these trends than 
would meet the eye of the casual observer. All have to do with sex 
roles and the problems that result if large numbers of males find 
their sexual identity outside marriage and family. Gilder insists 
that men and women have different and essential sex roles, in rela-
tion to work, sports, combat, and the home. They have different 
interests, mature at different rates, and hence learn and excel in dif-
ferent ways. The man's role as chief provider and the woman's role 
as chief nurturer are crucial; they are not merely cultural conven-
tions. "[Steven] Goldberg's rigorously argued The Inevitability of 
Patriarchy refutes every anthropological claim that there has ever 
existed in human affairs either a society where women rule, or a 
society where final authority resides with them in male-female rela-
tions." To try to ignore sexual differences, says Gilder, is to try to 
abolish human nature. 
I gather that the remedies Gilder would endorse include a radi-
cal departure from established welfare policy, remaining steadfast in 
restricting combat roles to males, ending the right to abortion on 
demand, and holding the line on further expansion of coeducation. 
Notably absent is any overt call for a repeal of laws forbidding sex 
discrimination in employment. Perhaps this is because he believes 
the evidence shows that sex roles in employment generally persist, 
and his welfare reform proposal would remove some of the eco-
nomic incentives that lead so many women to leave the home for 
work. His proposal, developed in a chapter aptly titled "Supporting 
Families," is borrowed from Patrick Moynihan and the experience 
of some countries, notably France and Japan. He calls for strength-
ening all families through a rather complex scheme of "family al-
lowances" related to children in the home. 
III 
As an abstraction, the individual right of moral autonomy is 
appealing and almost universally accepted in this country. But how 
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to give concrete content to the right from time to time, when it is 
asserted as a justification for behavior in various contexts, is another 
matter indeed. A crucially important subquestion, how responsibil-
ity for the task is allocated in our constitutional system, cannot be 
answered by moral philosophers. Richards's approach to "interpre-
tation" of the Constitution is philosophical sleight of hand, designed 
to maintain the pretense of interpretation while the text of the docu-
ment is being stripped of any function as a constraint on the 
Justices. 
If it is not pretentious to claim that there are "best" moral and 
political philosophies, it is dangerous to suppose that Supreme 
Court Justices are the people best suited to find and enforce them. 
Richards confuses what the founders thought about moral philoso-
phy with what they thought (or would have thought) about giving 
open-ended judicial review to life-tenured Justices. After all, the 
founders' credentials as political architects were considerably more 
impressive than their credentials as moral philosophers. So even if 
Professor Richards is right about their values, and the implications 
of those values for modern issues, I see no reason to reject their 
system of government in order to enforce their system of philoso-
phy. If anything about the Court emerged with clarity from our 
founding history, it was that the Justices were not to be a Council of 
Revision. And what emerges with clarity from our larger history is 
that morality and the shaping of our traditions are the subjects of 
continuing debate. Our moral traditions are always in a state of 
becoming. All of this strongly suggests the wisdom of renewing one 
of our most fundamental political traditions: expecting legislators 
to take seriously questions about who we as a people are and ought 
to strive to be. Again, history suggests that legislators can be as 
eloquent in these respects as the Court. 1 
I cannot imagine why Richards or anyone else would choose 
Richards's approach to constitutional law, except to obtain specific 
judicial decisions that they cherish. He says that orderly and pre-
dictable constraints on government were intended. But when his 
approach is brought to bear on specific issues it does not contribute 
to predictability. At least I could not discern where he was going 
7. A well done reminder on this point is Farber & Muench, The Ideological Origins of 
the Founeenth Amendment, I CONST. COMM. 235 (1984). The authors review the natural 
law thought (background interests?) that was pervasive during the country's founding and 
later, from the 1850s through the drafting of the fourteenth amendment. Locke's views were 
still influential, as were the ideas expressed in the Declaration of Independence. Private con-
tracts and property were prominent among the concepts claimed by influential writers of the 
times to be recognized by even a "higher law" than the Constitution. But what also shows 
through, at least as a matter of expression, are the ideals of equality and human dignity. 
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on many occasions until he told me. He argues, for example, that 
the state cannot, in any way, assist parental provision of parochial 
education. How could we predict that five Justices would select this 
theory of the parent-child-state relationship as the best? Or take 
another example: Would the reader who has not encountered the 
idea elsewhere guess that "equal respect" means that newspapers 
must be treated as public forums, with fair and equal access to all? 
For Richards, part of the constitutional text is everything, part 
is without real meaning, and part provides a launching pad. But his 
model of interpretation would appear to be as sound for all consti-
tutional provisions as it is for any. The scope of background rights 
and interests surely varies from provision to provision, but the "best 
political and moral theory," even of a contractarian kind, covers a 
lot of ground. Would it be a fair test of Richards's position to put 
George Gilder on the Court and ask him to follow Richards's gen-
eral interpretive theory? This idea is not wholly fanciful; after all, 
those who share Gilder's substantive world view probably outnum-
ber those who share Richards's,s and Richards's "Constitution" 
doesn't need lawyers to interpret it. 
What sorts of background rights might Justice Gilder ascribe 
to the founders? What might he determine to be the best contempo-
rary political and moral theory in a variety of contexts? Gilder pro-
fesses to stand in awe of women. His professed aim is to protect 
them from the aggressions of men. Women and weak men (weak in 
economic power or other attributes that allow some men to be seen 
as "powerful") are the tragic losers, says Gilder, when there is a 
breakdown in monogamy. Attractive, young women also prosper, 
but only while their beauty lasts. Monogamy, according to Gilder, 
is not merely the most desirable of several tolerable social arrange-
ments. As a core value it is the sine qua non of an enduring and 
bearable society. As a legislator, Gilder would not make homosex-
ual conduct a crime, but where would he line up as a Justice? Rich-
ards's moral theory leads naturally to a "suspect criterion" 
(immutable characteristic), "compelling interest" analysis that 
would outlaw discrimination against homosexuals. The same juris-
prudential framework, however, might lead a Gilder, convinced 
that the taboo against homosexuality is exceedingly valuable, to up-
8. John Ely and Mark Tushnet have noted the tendency of scholars such as Richards 
to reflect a preoccupation with interests and rights of first importance to what, for shorthand 
purposes, could be called the liberal elite, or more broadly in Ely's phrase, the "upper· middle 
professional class." J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 59 (1980); Tushnet, supra note 6 
passim. Though Gilder as a Harvard graduate is surely a member of this latter class, his 
concern is with an undifferentiated population, with a recurring focus on poor and average 
persons. 
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hold even criminal sanctions against homosexual acts, knowing full 
well that they will hardly ever be employed. 
Richards's argument for abortion on demand would be beside 
the point for Gilder, who insists that procreative power is a prime 
source of male affirmation. Gilder believes that the psychological 
consequences of placing complete control of procreation in the wo-
man are profound. He contends that the voters have repeatedly re-
fused to endorse broad liberalization of the abortion laws because it 
is an issue that psychologically underlies the "sexual constitution" 
regarding "sexuality, children and the family." They "instinctively 
recognize that preservation of the sexual constitution may be even 
more important to the social order than preservation of the legal 
constitution," for "no law can prevail against the dissolution of the 
social connections and personal motivations that sustain a civilized 
polity." Richards dismisses arguments against abortion based on 
sexuality and sex roles, because they are grounded in a moral con-
ception of the good life. They are therefore nonneutral and cannot 
support regulation as a general good. But for Gilder it is not just a 
matter of morals; it is a matter of civilization versus anarchy. 
Moreover, Richards's general goods concept does not flow from his 
interpretive theory; it flows from his "best" contemporary substan-
tive theory, which his interpretive theory permits him to construct.9 
Gilder could be expected to add a distinct layer to the background 
rights assumed by the founders, who after all had a viewpoint about 
sex roles that was much closer to Gilder's than to Richards's. We 
need not conclude that the founders' viewpoint was rejected in toto 
when a particular expression of it was repudiated by the nineteenth 
amendment. In Gilder's universe no one-certainly no heterosex-
ual woman-could count on being one of the few "winners" from a 
breakdown in monogamy, so the protections he would find essential 
9. Frequently the debate centering on writers such as Rawls or Richards focuses on 
whether a given rendition of moral philosophy is "right." Challenging a statement by Profes-
sor Ely that a method of moral philosophy simply does not exist, Professor Michael Glennon 
writes that disagreement with Rawls does not mean that Rawls is wrong. Perhaps the critics 
are wrong. "Democracy may be a great idea, but you can't decide whether a particular moral 
philosophy is 'fine' (to use Ely's word) through the use of public opinion." Glennon, Pe1'SOna/ 
Autonomy in Democracy and Distrust, I CoNST. CoMM. 229, 230 (1984). But if the Supreme 
Court decides Rawls is wrong, or screws up his theories, it will be open to others to say the 
Justices are wrong, but it may not do much good. As Justice Jackson observed, the Justices 
do not have the last word because they are infallible, but they are infallible because they have 
the last word. Returning to Richards, it is also necessary to remember that he devotes a 
substantial portion of his book to articulating the interpretive approach that can justify plug-
ging Rawls into the Constitution. But the approach does not dictate that; using the same 
approach, the Justices could plug in wholly unrelated concepts under various constitutional 
provisions and ignore Rawls. 
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to maintenance of monogamy might in his view be acceptable to all 
reasonable people. 
Richards does not simply suggest the propriety of his interpre-
tive approach; he would regard a failure to adopt it as irresponsible. 
He might change his mind if we had a Court of Justice Gilders, 
peppering the U.S. Reports with passages like this: 
There is, in fact, only one fully documented case surviving in the modern world of a 
tribe so abjectly retarded, or so mystically impervious to its own nature, that it 
simultaneously rejects and tries to abolish all three of these [universal] human char-
acteristics--sex roles, religion and property rights. That group, not even strictly 
speaking a tribe, is, of course, the community of social science scholars in America. 
There is much more to Richards's thesis than meets his eye. 
One need not accept all of Gilder's arguments (I don't) to 
profit from consideration of his underlying premise. Even those of 
ardent feminist persuasion, female and male, are likely to be re-
minded of a good many obvious facts. Gilder makes it clear in his 
preface that his major goal is to fight what he fears has become the 
conventional wisdom of sexual liberation and the denial of male and 
female natures. If he is even half right in his observations, some 
esteemed works may be basically nonsense. Whatever its faults, 
Gilder's book is a useful antidote to the literature of unisex on the 
one hand, and free sex, on the other. 
Gilder does have an axe to grind, and this causes occasional 
overstatement. The very nature of his message leads him to engage 
in stereotyping on a grand scale. Furthermore, his theory about the 
effect of the woman's control of abortion on the man's sexual iden-
tity is exceedingly speculative. to Even if one accepts the theory, the 
policy implications are not clear unless one also believes with Gilder 
that civilization is at risk. Unless that is indeed the case, abortion 
restrictions merely transfer the man's problem (as Gilder sees it) 
back to the woman. Here, I believe, is the rub in this book. Gilder 
apparently wants women to submerge their vocational talents and 
aspirations in the interests of family life, child rearing, and preser-
vation of the male's sexual identity within the restraints of 
marriage. 
10. It is no simple matter to put a label on the abortion decisions as pro men or pro 
women. Professor Mary Ann Glendon's ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 
( 1987) points out that the strongest supporters of abortion prior to Roe v. Wade were affluent 
white men. This is not necessarily inconsistent with Gilder's viewpoint, but Glendon also 
notes that more women than men supported the decision of the West German Constitutional 
Court invalidating the 19741aw that allowed elective abortions within a specified time period. 
She concludes that though Roe might therefore be regarded as a "masculine decision," it is 
probably not. Rather, it "is more distinctively American than it is masculine in its lonely 
individualism and libertarianism." /d. at 51-52. Professor Glendon unravels some of the 
complexities of abortion regulation with insight and thoughtfulness. 
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Charged with indifference to women's interests, Gilder would 
reply that the female's true interests depend on allowing the male to 
develop a healthy sexual identity. This will not sound strange to the 
millions of women in this and past generations who have spent their 
lives following the advice that Gilder offers. But sociology and eco-
nomics tell us that if current trends threaten to dissolve the bonds 
that check male aggression, we will have to find other ways to pre-
serve those bonds. Today's small families do not occupy anyone's 
full-time attention for more than a brief period. Even if the woman 
happily accepts the role of mother in the home, she will naturally 
seek other outlets eventually, and jobs are society's measures of 
worth. In any event, women have been entering the workforce in 
increasing numbers since 1964, and it was predictable that as one-
earner families became two-earner families, living costs and new 
minimum standards of the good life would rise to meet new income 
levels. For most families, the choices Gilder urges are not realisti-
cally available. Still, it is not easy to resist the thought that Gilder 
is on to something when one sees the divorce statistics, and the daily 
reports linking the persistence of poverty and high crime rates to 
single parent families. We can learn from Gilder even while re-
jecting some of his arguments and innuendoes. 
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